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Statement by
Bruce Alberts, President, National Academy of Sciences,
Wm. A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering, and
Kenneth I. Shine, President, Institute of Medicine,
On Balancing Openness and Secrecy
At U.S. Weapons Laboratories

Nov. 19, 1999


In a statement issued last May, we expressed our deep concern that inappropriate restrictions on the interaction between scientists at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories and foreign nationals could harm our national security interests. Although the harshest of the restrictions that were proposed in the initial heat of allegations about thefts of nuclear secrets have not come to pass, the DOE and Congress have instituted wide-ranging organizational and policy changes aimed at improving security at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories. As elaborated in our previous statement, both secrecy and scientific openness contribute to our security. At present, far more attention is being directed toward avoiding the risks of potential espionage than toward ensuring that we realize the benefits of a properly balanced policy. Thus, we are already witnessing a weakening in the ability of our nuclear weapons laboratories to recruit the bright young scientists graduating from the nation's universities.

The National Academies have prepared a report, Balancing Scientific Openness and National Security Controls at the Nation's Nuclear Weapons Laboratories, written by a distinguished committee with long experience in using science and technology in the support of U.S. national security. Starting from the premise that the "protection of information that relates to the construction of nuclear weapons is of the highest importance to national security," this report reviews the important benefits that scientific openness at the National Laboratories provides to the nation's ability to maintain safe and reliable nuclear weapons and to achieve important nonproliferation goals. It lays out five general principles to help guide the Department of Energy in assessing any proposed security reforms.
    1) Beware of prejudice against foreigners. Throughout its history and certainly during the nuclear era the United States has benefited enormously from the contributions of foreign-born scientists. In its review of the available unclassified literature, the committee found no evidence that such scientists have been the source of leaked classified information. Approximately 50 percent of all doctoral students in U.S. science and engineering programs are non-citizens, a major source of scientific and technical talent for our R&D programs. In another context, but with great prescience, President Harry Truman warned more than 50 years ago that, "We cannot drive scientists into our laboratories, but if we tolerate reckless or unfair attacks, we can certainly drive them out."

    2) Educate staff. Ultimately, there is no substitute for the professional integrity of individual scientists and laboratory management. The key ingredient is fostering an awareness and appreciation throughout the laboratory staff, supported by engaged line management, of the nature of the threats and the methods of prevention. To support this effort, security procedures must be clear, easy to follow, and serve an understandable purpose.

    3) Streamline procedures. Good science is compatible with good security only if there is consistent attention to creating procedures that establish needed security protections while minimizing interference with work. If procedures sweep too widely or are too cumbersome, compliance will be compromised.

    4) Focus efforts. A number of reports from the Academies have recommended that security is best served if efforts concentrate on protecting the most important information. Over time, with the advent of the Information Age, this goal has become even more critical. Building high fences around narrow areas increases the odds that truly vital secrets are guarded well, while maintaining the important benefits that come from access to the international enterprise of cutting-edge science.

    5) Maintain balance. International engagement by laboratory personnel is essential to fulfilling basic missions, but that dialogue must be balanced by tight controls on the most sensitive information. U.S. national security will be best advanced by encouraging both the engagement and control aspects of this policy.

    In summary, wise policies are difficult to formulate and hard to sustain in the heat of political controversy. Tension is inevitable: We desire to reap the full benefits that openness in the conduct of research can yield, and yet we need to prevent an adversary from gaining vital weapons-related information. The key is to remember that both openness and secrecy must be part of a strong national security strategy.